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Abstract. We consider hedonic coalition formation games in which each player
has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalition struc-
tures are based on the best player (B-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player
(W /W-hedonic games) in his coalition. We show that for B-hedonic games, an
individually stable partition is guaranteed to exist and can be computed efficiently.
Similarly, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which returns a Nash stable
partition (if one exists) for B-hedonic games with strict preferences. It is also
shown that for B- and W -hedonic games, checking whether a Nash stable parti-
tion or an individually stable partition exists is NP-complete even in some cases
for strict preferences. As a result of our investigation, we identify a key source
of intractability in compact coalition formation games in which preferences over
players are extended to preferences over coalitions.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation plays a fundamental role in various multiagent settings. The fol-
lowing quotation from [6] nicely highlights the significance of coalition formation:
“Coalition formation is of fundamental importance in a wide variety of social,
economic, and political problems, ranging from communication and trade to
legislative voting. As such, there is much about the formation of coalitions that
deserves study.”
Coalition formation games, as introduced by Dre`ze and Greenberg [11], provide
a simple but versatile formal model that allows one to focus on coalition formation.
In many situations it is natural to assume that a player’s appreciation of a coalition
structure only depends on the coalition he is a member of and not on how the remaining
players are grouped. Initiated by Banerjee et al. [4] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6],
much of the work on coalition formation now concentrates on these so-called hedonic
games.
The main focus in hedonic games has been on notions of stability for coalition
structures. Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6] formalized individual-based stability concepts
∗ This material is based upon work supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under
grants BR-2312/6-1 (within the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES program Log-
ICCC) and BR 2312/7-1. Many thanks to Felix Brandt and Matthew Jackson for some useful
discussions on coalition formation.
NS IS CIS & IR
B (general) ? in P (Th. 7) in P (Prop. 1)
B (strict preferences) in P (Th. 6) in P (Th. 7) in P (Prop. 1)
B (general) NPC (Th. 3) NPC (Th. 2) in P (Prop. 1)
B (strict preferences) NPC (Th. 3) NPC (Th. 2) in P (Prop. 1)
B (no unacceptability) in P (Obs. 1) in P (Obs. 1) in P (Prop. 1)
W /W (general) NPC (Th. 3) NPC (Th. 4) in P (Prop. 1)
W /W (strict preferences) NPC (Th. 3) ? in P (Prop. 1)
W /W (no unacceptability) in P (Obs. 1) in P (Obs. 1) in P (Prop. 1)
Table 1. Complexity of individual-based stability: the positive results even hold for computation
of stable partitions whereas the NP-completeness results even hold for checking the existence of
a stable partition.
(Nash stability (NS), individual stability (IS), and contractual individual stability (CIS))
and group-based stability concepts (core (C) and strict core (SC)) in the context of he-
donic games. The most prominent examples of hedonic games are two-sided matching
games in which only coalitions of size two are admissible [19]. We refer to Hajdukova´
[16] and Cechla´rova´ [7] for a critical overview of hedonic games.
Hedonic games involve preferences over sets of players. This leads to the challenge
of succinctly representing hedonic games (see e.g., [12]). A natural method to repre-
sent them is for each player to have preferences over the individual players and then
extend these preferences to preferences over sets of players. This method includes ad-
ditively separable preferences in which cardinal utilities are considered [2, 6]. Other
natural ways to represent preferences over coalitions is to base them on the best player
in the coalition (e.g., B-preferences) or on the worst player in the coalition (e.g., W -
preferences). Preferences over sets of objects based on the worst or best object in the
set is a standard method for preference extension which satisfies various desirable ax-
ioms [5]. Such preference extensions can serve as building blocks to form more complex
preference extensions.
B-preferences and W -preferences are two of the most natural ordinal-based com-
pact representations for hedonic games [10, 8, 9]. B-preferences model scenarios where
players are ‘optimistic’ in nature and each player’s evaluation of a coalition depends on
his most favored players in that coalition [16]. On the other hand, W -preferences model
‘pessimistic’ players where the player’s happiness depends on the least favored players
in his coalition. This is based on the premise that ‘a team is only as good as the weakest
link’. We refer to hedonic games with B-preferences and W -preferences as B-hedonic
games and W -hedonic games respectively.
In many distributed settings, agents have limited communication with other agents
or insufficient trust over others which motivates the use of individual-based stabil-
ity concepts rather than group-based stability concepts to model coalition formation.
Compared to the group-based stability concepts such as the core, the complexity of
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individual-based stability concepts has not been examined for W - and B-hedonic games.
In fact Hajdukova´ [16] points out that
“It would be interesting to study the computational complexity questions also
for problems of deciding the existence of a Nash stable, an individually stable
and a contractually individually stable partition in games with B, W , [. . .]
preferences.”
We answer the questions of Hajdukova´ [16] and present a thorough investigation of
individual-based stability in hedonic games in which preferences are derived from the
best or worst player in the coalition. Our analysis includes positive results like the guar-
anteed existence of individually stable partitions for B-hedonic games and also an in-
sight into a key cause of intractability of stable partitions in hedonic games based on
preferences over players.
Along with B- and W -hedonic games, we consider two new variants, namely the B-
and W-hedonic games, with the main difference being how unacceptability of a player
is perceived. In particular, while the presence of an unacceptable player in a coalition in
B-hedonic games becomes irrelevant under the presence of other players in the same
coalition, in B- and W- hedonic games a single unacceptable player suffices to make
the coalition unattractive. W-hedonic games coincide with W -hedonic games when in-
dividual rational outcomes are considered. On the other hand, B-hedonic games are not
equivalent to B-hedonic games: unacceptability of coalitions is defined differently and
the sizes of coalitions are not important. B-hedonic games present a number of inter-
esting properties. They are defined in a symmetric way to W - for which the coalition
size does not affect the preferences of players. Secondly, marriage games are a subclass
of the intersection of B- and W -hedonic games and this highlights the symmetry be-
tween B- and W-hedonic games. Thirdly, our definition of B-hedonic games depends
very naturally on the meaning of unacceptable players, i.e., if a player i finds player j
unacceptable, he would rather be alone than ever be with j even in the presence of other
players. Interestingly, our computational analysis of B-hedonic games and B-hedonic
games helps highlight the source of intractability in a large family of coalition formation
games.
Contributions We present a number of computational results regarding individual-
based stability in very natural models of coalition formation games. We show that for
B-hedonic games, at least one individually stable partition exists and it can be com-
puted in linear time. A Nash stable partition may not exist. However, it can be checked
in linear time whether a Nash stable exists for B-hedonic games with strict prefer-
ences, and in case of existence, such a partition can be returned. It is also shown that a
contractually individually stable and individually rational partition can be computed in
polynomial time for all the games considered.
For B- and W -hedonic games, checking whether a Nash stable partition exists is
NP-complete even when preferences are strict. Also, for B- and W -hedonic games,
checking whether an individually stable partition exists is NP-complete. For B-hedonic
games, the result holds even if preferences are strict.
We obtain a general insight that in coalition formation games based on extensions
of preferences over players to preferences over sets, the following property leads to
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intractability: the presence of an unacceptable player makes the coalition unacceptable.
Our results are summarized in Table 1, which gives an almost complete characterization
of the complexity of individual-based stability in B-, B- and W -hedonic games. Since
we consider very restrictive models of coalition formation games, our hardness results
carry over to more elaborate settings.
2 Related work
Computational complexity of computing stable outcomes for coalition formation games
is an active area of research in theoretical computer science [7], game theory [16], and
multiagent systems (see e.g., [2, 14]). Coalition formation games have also received
attention from the artificial intelligence community, where the focus has generally been
on computing partitions that give rise to the greatest social welfare (e.g., [20]).
Both W - and B-hedonic games were first introduced by Cechla´rova´ and Romero-
Medina [10]. Since then, the complexity of computing and verifying stable partitions
for W - and B-hedonic games has been studied (see e.g., [8, 9]). For W -hedonic games,
it is NP-hard to check whether the core is non-empty. The core can be empty even if
preferences are strict [9]. For B-hedonic games, Cechla´rova´ and Hajdukova´ [8] showed
that it is NP-hard to check whether the core or strict core is empty. For B-hedonic games
with strict preferences, Cechla´rova´ and Romero-Medina [10] proved that the strict core
is non-empty and a strict core stable partition can be computed in polynomial time by a
generalization of Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm [21].
Recently, Aziz et al. [1] examined the complexity of Pareto optimal partitions for B-
and W-hedonic games. They showed that although computing a Pareto optimal partition
is NP-hard for B-hedonic games, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the
problem for W-hedonic games.
The complexity of individual-based stability has been investigated previously for
hedonic games represented by individually rational lists of coalitions [3] and also ad-
ditively separable hedonic games (see e.g., [18, 13, 22, 14]). In particular, in a paper
in last year’s AAMAS, Gairing and Savani [14] examined individual-based stability in
symmetric additively separable hedonic games. However, none of the results for other
representations of hedonic games imply any of the results for hedonic games based on
the best or worst players. Our focus on hedonic games based on the best or worst player
is motivated by the natural ordinal nature of the games, their succinct representation,
and the hardness of deciding the existence of or computing stable outcomes for other
succinct representation of hedonic games.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the terminology and notation used in this paper.
Hedonic games Let N be a set of n players. A coalition is any non-empty subset of N.
By Ni we denote the set of all coalitions player i may belong to, i.e., Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈
S }. A coalition structure, or simply a partition, is a partition π of the players N into
coalitions, where π(i) is the coalition player i belongs to.
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A hedonic game is a pair (N,%), where %= (%1, . . . ,%n) is a preference profile spec-
ifying the preferences of each player i as a binary, complete, reflexive, and transitive
preference relation %i over Ni. If %i is also anti-symmetric we say that i’s preferences
are strict. Note that S ≻i T if S %i T but not T %i S —i.e., if i strictly prefers S to T—and
S ∼i T if both S %i T and T %i S —i.e., if i is indifferent between S and T .
For a player i, a coalition S in Ni is acceptable if for i being in S is at least as
preferable as being alone—i.e., if S %i {i}—and unacceptable otherwise. If in player i’s
preference over other players, j ≻i i, then we say that i likes j.
In a similar fashion, for X a subset of Ni, a coalition S in X is said to be most
preferred in X by i if S %i T for all T in X and least preferred in X by i if T %i S for all
T ∈ X. In case X = Ni we generally omit the reference to X. The sets of most and least
preferred coalitions in X by i, we denote by max%i (X) and min%i (X), respectively.
In hedonic games, players are only interested in the coalition they are in. Accord-
ingly, preferences over coalitions naturally extend to preferences over partitions and we
write π%i π′ if π(i)%i π′(i). We also say that partition π is acceptable or unacceptable
to a player i according to whether π(i) is acceptable or unacceptable to i, respectively.
Moreover, π is individually rational (IR) if π is acceptable to all players.
Classes of hedonic games The number of coalitions grows exponentially in the number
of players. In this sense, hedonic games are relatively large objects and for algorithmic
purposes it is often useful to look at classes of games that allow for concise representa-
tions.
We now describe classes of hedonic games in which the players’ preferences over
coalitions are naturally induced by their preferences over the other players. Therefore,
we will use the same notation %i for each player i’s preferences over players and also
over coalitions. For %i, preferences of player i over players, we say that a player j is
acceptable to i if j%i i and unacceptable otherwise.
For a subset J of players, we denote by max%i (J) and min%i(J) the sets of the most
and least preferred players in J by i, respectively. We will assume that max%i(∅) =
min%i (∅) = {i}. Let i ∈ N and let S , T ∈ Ni.
– In a B-hedonic game, the preferences %i of a player i over players extend to prefer-
ences over coalitions in such a way that we have S %i T if and only if
1. some j in T is unacceptable to i or
2. neither S nor T contains a player unacceptable to i and for each s ∈ max%i(S \
{i}) and t ∈ max%i (T \ {i}), s %i t.
– In a W-hedonic game (N,%), we have S %i T if and only if
1. some j in T is unacceptable to i, or
2. for each s ∈ min%i (S \ {i}) and t ∈ min%i(T \ {i}), s %i t.
– In hedonic games with W -preferences (which we will refer to as W -hedonic games),
S %i T if and only if
for each s ∈ min%i (S \ {i}) and t ∈ min%i(T \ {i}), s %i t.
– In hedonic games with B-preferences (which we will refer to as B-hedonic games),
S ≻i T if and only if
1. for each s ∈ max%i (S \ {i}) and t ∈ max%i (T \ {i}), s ≻i t, or
2. for each s ∈ max%i (S \ {i}) and t ∈ max%i (T \ {i}), s ∼i t and |S | < |T |.
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W-hedonic games are equivalent to hedonic games with W -preferences if only indi-
vidually rational outcomes are considered. Unlike hedonic games with B-preferences,
B-hedonic games are defined in analogy to W-hedonic games and the preferences are
not based on coalition sizes (cf. [10]).
Example 1. Consider the preferences of player 1 over other players:
2 ≻1 3 ≻1 1 ≻1 4
Then, in corresponding B-, W-, B-, and W -hedonic game, the preferences of player 1
over coalitions which include 1 are induced as follows.
– B-hedonic game: {1, 2} ∼1 {1, 2, 3} ≻1 {1, 3} ≻1 {1} ≻1 {1, 4} ∼1 {1, 2, 4} ∼1
{1, 3, 4} ∼1 {1, 2, 3, 4}.
– W-hedonic game: {1, 2} ≻1 {1, 2, 3} ∼1 {1, 3} ≻1 {1} ≻1 {1, 4} ∼1 {1, 2, 4} ∼1
{1, 3, 4} ∼1 {1, 2, 3, 4}.
– B-hedonic game: {1, 2} ≻1 {1, 2, 3} ∼1 {1, 2, 4} ≻1 {1, 2, 3, 4} ≻1 {1, 3} ≻1 {1, 3, 4} ≻1
{1} ≻1 {1, 4}.
– W -hedonic game: {1, 2} ≻1 {1, 2, 3} ∼1 {1, 3} ≻1 {1} ≻1 {1, 4} ∼1 {1, 2, 4} ∼1
{1, 3, 4} ∼1 {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Note that player 1’s preferences over other players lead to the same preferences over
coalitions in both W- and W - hedonic game.
Stability Concepts We now present the standard stability concepts for hedonic games.
A partition π is individually rational (IR) if each player does as well in his current
coalition as by being alone, i.e., for all i ∈ N, π(i) %i {i}. The following are standard
stability concepts based on deviations by individual players.
– A partition is Nash stable (NS) if no player can benefit by moving from his coalition
S to another (possibly empty) coalition T .
– A partition is individually stable (IS) if no player can benefit by moving from his
coalition S to another existing (possibly empty) coalition T while not making the
members of T worse off.
– A partition is contractually individually stable (CIS) if no player can benefit by
moving from his coalition S to another existing (possibly empty) coalition T while
making neither the members of S nor the members of T worse off.
We also define standard stability concepts based on deviations by groups of players.
– A coalition S ⊆ N blocks a partition π, if each player i ∈ S strictly prefers S to
his current coalition π(i) in the partition π. A partition which admits no blocking
coalition is said to be in the core (C).
– A coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks a partition π, if each player i ∈ S weakly prefers
S to π(i) and there exists at least one player j ∈ S who strictly prefers S to his
current coalition π( j). A partition which admits no weakly blocking coalition is in
the strict core (SC).
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The inclusion relationships between stability concepts depicted in Figure 1 follow from
the definitions of the concepts. Note that depending on the context, we will denote by
NS, IS, and CIS either Nash stable, individually stable, and contractual individually
stable respectively or Nash stability, individual stability, and contractual individual sta-
bility respectively.
We first note that a partition which is both CIS and IR can be computed in polyno-
mial time for both B- and W -hedonic games:
Proposition 1. A CIS and IR partition can be computed in polynomial time for B-,B-,
W -, and W-hedonic games.
Proof. Take the individually rational partition of singletons. If the partition is CIS, we
are done. Otherwise, if there is a feasible CIS deviation, we let the deviation take place.
In each CIS deviation at least one player strictly improves his utility and no player’s
utility decreases. Since there can only be a maximum of a polynomial number of CIS
deviations (n(n − 1) for B-, W -, and W-hedonic games—and n2(n − 1) in the case of
B-hedonic games), a CIS and IR partition is obtained in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
Moreover, for B-, B-, W - and W-hedonic games, individual-based stability can
be verified in polynomial-time. This means that checking the existence of individual-
based stability is in NP. Since, W-hedonic games coincide with W -hedonic games when
individually rational outcomes are considered, all our results for Nash stability and
individual stability equivalently apply to W- and W -hedonic games. Therefore, from
now on, we will only focus on W -hedonic games rather than both W- and W -hedonic
games.
4 B- and W -hedonic games: Nash stability
In this section, we consider Nash stability in B- and W -hedonic games.
Observation 1. For both W - and B-hedonic games, if preferences contain no unac-
ceptable players, then the partition consisting of the grand coalition is Nash stable and
therefore individually stable.
NS SC
IS C
CIS & IR
Fig. 1. Inclusion relationships between stability concepts. For example, every Nash stable parti-
tion is also individually stable.
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We present an example of a W - or B-hedonic game for which there is no NS parti-
tion. This holds even if preferences are strict but do allow unacceptability.
Example 2. Consider the hedonic game (N,%) where N = {1, 2} such that 1 has no
other acceptable players and player 2 likes the company of 1. Therefore, {1} ≻1 {1, 2}
and {1, 2} ≻2 {2}. We see that the game has no NS partition since player 2 joins player
1 and then player 1 leaves player 2 alone. We call this game the stalker game where
player 1 is clearly being stalked.
We first prove that for both W - and B-hedonic games, deciding whether a NS par-
tition exists is NP-complete. Theorem 1 will be subsumed by a later result which states
that for W -hedonic and B-hedonic games, deciding whether a NS partition exists is
NP-complete even if preferences are strict. However, we present Theorem 1 to provide
better intuition and as a warm-up for the technically more involved proofs of Theo-
rems 2 and 3.
Theorem 1. For W -hedonic and B-hedonic games, deciding whether a NS partition
exists is NP-complete.
Proof. By a reduction from Sat [15]. Let ϕ = X1∧· · ·∧Xk be a Boolean formula in con-
junctive normal form in which all and only the Boolean variables p1, . . . , pm occur. Now
define the B-hedonic game (N,%), where N = {X1, . . . , Xk} ∪ {p1,¬p1, . . . , pm,¬pm} ∪
{0, 1}.
The main idea is to design the “clause” players (X1, . . . , Xk) so as to be stalkers of
player 1, like in the stalker game. Define the preferences % such that for each literal p
or ¬p, and each clause X = (x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xℓ),
p : (0, 1, , p ‖ ¬p, X1, . . . , Xk)
¬p : (0, 1, ,¬p ‖ p, X1, . . . , Xk)
X : (1, | X1, . . . , Xk ‖ 0, x1, . . . , xℓ)
0 : ( , 0 ‖ 1, X1, . . . , Xk)
1 : ( , 1 ‖ 0, X1, . . . , Xk),
where the horizontal lines stand for the players not explicitly mentioned in the list,
the vertical lines divide the players into equivalence classes, and the players after the
double vertical lines are unacceptable. We have introduced the new notation to improve
readability: in the preference list of player i, vertical bars are for ≻i and commas are for
∼i.
We prove that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if a NS (and IR) partition for (N,%) exists.
To this end, first assume that v is a valuation that satisfies ϕ. Then, define the parti-
tion π such that
π = {{1, x′1, . . . , x
′
ℓ′ }, {0, x
′′
1 , . . . , x
′′
ℓ′′ }, {X1, . . . , Xk}}
where x′1, . . . , x
′
ℓ′
are the literals rendered true by v and x′′1 , . . . , x′′ℓ′′ those that are
thus rendered false. Obviously, π is a favorite partition for both 0 and 1 and as such
they do not want to deviate. With v being well-defined as a valuation, no two “literal”
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players p and ¬p are in the same coalition, i.e., p ∈ π(0) if and only if ¬p ∈ π(1).
Thus, every “literal” player is in a favorite coalition and does not want to deviate either.
For each “clause” player X = (x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xℓ), both π(0) and π(1) are unacceptable—the
former, because 0 ∈ π(0), the latter, because v satisfies F and, therefore, at least one
of x1, . . . , xℓ is in π(1). Thus, no player wishes to deviate to another coalition.
For the opposite direction, first observe that, if there is an individually rational par-
tition π such that for each clause X = (x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xℓ) at least one of x1, . . . , xℓ is in π(1),
the valuation v that sets all literals in π(1) to true, satisfies ϕ. In particular, observe that v
is thus well-defined, as for no Boolean variable p, both p and ¬p can both be in π(1)
without violating individual rationality.
Now assume that there is no valuation satisfying ϕ and consider an arbitrary NS
partition structure π. π must also be IR. Then, by the previous observation, for some
“clause” player X = (x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xℓ) none of x1, . . . , xℓ is in π(1), nor is 0, X himself,
or any other “clause” player, as each of these are unacceptable to 1. Also by individual
rationality, none of the “literal” players p nor 0 is in π(X). It follows that X would like
to deviate and join π(1), so as to improve both the best and the worst player in his
coalition. In that case though, we have an instance of the stalker game, with X being the
stalker of player 1. It follows that π is not NS. ⊓⊔
5 B- and W -hedonic games: individual stability
We first show that B- and W -hedonic games may not admit an IS partition even if
preferences are strict:
Example 3. Consider the game (N,%) such that N = {1, . . . , 5} and % is strict but allows
unacceptability. For each player i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, his preferences look as following i : i+1 ≻i
i − 1 ≻i i ≻i · · · . Similarly, 1 ≻5 4 ≻5 5 ≻5 · · · , and 2 ≻1 5 ≻1 1 ≻1 · · · . We know that
there are no IR coalitions of size more than or equal to 3. The partition of singletons is
certainly not IS. In fact, any IR partition and also potentially IS partition consists of one
singleton and two acceptable pairs. Then, it can be seen that any IR and potentially IS
partition cycles via IS deviations. Without a loss of generality, assume that the starting
partition is {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, {1}}. Then, the IS deviations lead to the following series of
partitions:
1. {{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}};
2. {{5, 1}, {2, 3}, {4}};
3. {{5, 1}, {2}, {3, 4}};
4. {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}};
5. {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}}; and then again
6. {{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}}.
We will call (N,%) the extended stalker game.
From Example 3, we know that if preferences are strict but allow unacceptable
players, there may not exist any IS or strict core stable partition.
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Theorem 2. Checking whether an IS partition exists is NP-complete for B-hedonic
games with strict preferences.
Proof. By a reduction from Sat. Let ϕ = X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xk be a Boolean formula in con-
junctive normal form in which all and only the Boolean variables p1, . . . , pm occur. Let
X = {X1, . . . , Xk} and P = {p1, . . . , pm}. Without loss of generality, we will assume
that there is no clause X ∈ X and variable p, such that X contains both literals p and
¬p. Also, we assume that for each variable p, both literals p,¬p appear in ϕ. For any
clause X ∈ X , let LX+ , LX− denote the sets of all positive and all negative literals in X,
respectively and let LX = LX+ ∪ LX− . Now, we define the B-hedonic game (N,%), where
N = {1X , 2X , 3X , 4X, 5X | X ∈ X } ∪
⋃
p∈P
{0p}
∪
⋃
X∈X
{pX | p ∈ LX+} ∪
⋃
X∈X
{¬pX |¬p ∈ LX−}.
The main idea will be that unless ϕ is satisfiable, an instance of the extended stalker
game will appear.
Let Cp =
⋃
X∈X {pX | p ∈ LX+}, C¬p =
⋃
X∈X {¬pX |¬p ∈ LX−}. Cp, (C¬p) is the set
of players that correspond to all copies of the positive (negative) literal p (one copy for
each clause in which the literal appears). Also, let P = ⋃p∈P (Cp ∪ C¬p).
Define the preferences % such that for each variable p, and each clause X ∈ X ,
pX : (0p | Cp \ {pX} | 1X | P \ (Cp ∪ C¬p) | pX ‖ )
¬pX : (0p | C¬p \ {¬pX} | 1X | P \ (Cp ∪ C¬p) | ¬pX ‖ )
0p : (Cp ∪ C¬p, | 0p ‖ )
1X : (2X | LX | 5X | 1X ‖ )
2X : (3X | 1X | 2X ‖ )
3X : (4X | 2X | 3X ‖ )
4X : (5X | 3X | 4X ‖ )
5X : (1X | 4X | 5X ‖ )
where in the above, using a set of players S in the preference of a player implies any
arbitrary ordering of the players in S . In the preference lists, like in the proof of The-
orem 1, the vertical lines divide the players into equivalence classes, and the players
after the double vertical lines are unacceptable. Recall that we have introduced the new
notation to improve readability: in the preference list of player i, vertical bars are for ≻i
and commas are for ∼i. Also, the horizontal lines stand for any arbitrary ordering of the
players not explicitly mentioned in the list.
We show that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if (N,%) has a non-empty set of IS partitions.
First assume that ϕ is satisfiable and v is a valuation that satisfies ϕ. Let Tv =⋃
p:v(p)=true Cp, Fv =
⋃
p:v(p)=false C¬p. Then, define the partition π as
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{{2X , 3X} | X ∈ X } ∪ {{4X , 5X} | X ∈ X }∪
{{1X} ∪ (Tv ∩ LX) | X ∈ X }∪
{{0p} ∪ (Fv ∩ (Cp ∪ C¬p)) | p ∈ P}.
– For each X ∈ X , 1X cannot join π(2X) because of the presence of 3X .
– For each X ∈ X , 2X is only with 3X and therefore in a most preferred coalition.
– For each X ∈ X , 3X cannot join π(4X) because of the presence of 5X .
– For each X ∈ X , 4X is only with 5X and therefore in a most preferred coalition.
– For each X ∈ X , 5X cannot join π(1X) because of the presence of a player pX , for
some p ∈ P .
– For each p ∈ P , 0p is together only with a non-empty subset of Cp ∪ C¬p, strictly
preferring that to being alone. Any pX that is not in the same coalition with 0p is
together with 1X , therefore 0p does not want to join.
– For each p ∈ P , either all players in Cp, or all players in C¬p are together with
0p and with no other players: assume that C¬p is the set of players with 0p (the
case 0p ∈ Cp is proven similarly). Then each player pX ∈ Cp is together with 1X
and the players in LX+ . They would prefer to join the coalition of 0p, but they are
blocked by players in C¬p. Players in C¬p also cannot move to a better coalition,
as they prefer their current coalition to being alone. They would prefer a coalition
only with players in Cp \ {pX}, but all such players are either together with 0p, or
with 1Y , for some Y , X.
Therefore, π is IS.
For the other direction, assume that there is an IS partition π. Note first that for any
p ∈ P there can be no X, Y ∈ X , such that pX and ¬pY are in the same coalition
in π. Moreover, not both pX and ¬pY are each together with 1X and 1Y , respectively.
Assume that this was the case. Then, at least one of them would be able to move to
0p to take part in a more preferred coalition: Either 0p is alone and welcomes either of
them, or it is together with players either from Cp, or from C¬p, which would welcome
p or ¬p, respectively. Therefore, for any variable p, either only members of Cp or only
members of C¬p can be together with players 1X1 , . . . , 1Xk . Notice now that there can be
no clause X∗ ∈ X , such that no pX∗ is together with 1X∗ , for any p ∈ P . For the sake of
contradiction, assume that this were the case. Then 1X∗ would be alone, and 5X∗ would
break off his coalition to join 1X∗ . But then this would lead to a series of deviations,
with 1X∗ breaking the coalition with 5X∗ to join 2X∗ , etc. Therefore, π would not be an
IS partition. Therefore, for each X ∈ X , there is some pX that is together with 1X .
Consider now the following valuation vπ: For any p ∈ P , assign vπ(p) = true, if and
only if there is at least one player pX in π that is in the same coalition as 1X , for any
X ∈ X . From the above, vπ is a a valid truthful assignment for ϕ, i.e., ϕ is satisfiable.
⊓⊔
The proof of the previous statement can also be used to state the following.
Theorem 3. Checking whether an NS partition exists is NP-complete for B-hedonic
games or W-hedonic games with strict preferences.
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Finally, we have the following result.
Theorem 4. Checking whether an IS partition exists is NP-complete for W -hedonic
games.
Proof. The reduction is same as in the proof of Theorem 2 except that preferences of
certain players are as follows:
pX : (0p,Cp \ {pX} | 1X , P \ (Cp ∪ C¬p) | pX ‖ )
¬pX : (0p,C¬p \ {¬pX} | 1X , P \ (Cp ∪ C¬p) | ¬pX ‖ )
0p : (Cp,C¬p, 0p ‖ )
⊓⊔
It is not known whether Theorem 4 also holds for W -hedonic games with strict
preferences. However, there is a certain condition under which an IS partition can be
computed in polynomial time. The roommate problem is a generalization of the stable
marriage problem in which each agent has preferences over the other agents and then
the agents are paired up in a stable manner [17]. The problem can be seen as hedonic
game called roommate game in which only coalitions of size one or two are acceptable.
We see that the same preferences of players over other players can represent roommate
games and also W -hedonic games. For roommate games with strict preferences, a core
stable matching corresponds to a strict core stable partition for the corresponding W -
hedonic game [10]. Therefore, the algorithm of Irving [17] can be used to check whether
a core stable matching exists for the roommate games with strict preferences and if it
exists, then the matching is a strict core stable and thereby IS partition for the W -
hedonic game with the same preference profile.
6 B-hedonic games: Nash & individual stability
We start with an easy observation.
Observation 2. For B-hedonic games, if each player likes at least some player, then
the partition consisting of the grand coalition is Nash stable.
For B-hedonic games, even if preferences allow no unacceptability of players, a NS
partition may still not exist. Consider a two-player B-hedonic game in which player 1
finds player 2 simply acceptable and 2 likes 1. Then the grand coalition is not NS.
Although, NS partitions may not exist for B-hedonic games, one can efficiently check
whether a NS partition exists if preferences are strict. The result holds not only for
strict preferences but also for preferences in which there may be ties but they satisfy the
unique favorite property (if a player likes some other players, he has a unique favorite
player).
Theorem 5. For B-hedonic games which satisfy the unique favorite property, there
exists a linear time algorithm to check whether a NS partition exists or not.
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Proof. If each player likes at least one (acceptable) player, then the partition consisting
of the grand coalition is NS and we are done. If there exists a set of players A who find
everyone else at best acceptable, form the partition {N \ A} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ A}. Note that each
player j ∈ N \ A likes at least one other player k ∈ N. Also any NS partition will have
players in A as singletons. Now for any j ∈ N \ A, if j’s favorite player is in A, then
return ‘no’. Else, return the partition π = (N \ A) ∪ {{i} | i ∈ A}.
We first show that if there exists a player j ∈ N \ A who has a favorite player in
A, then there does not exist an NS partition. In any NS partition, players in A would
be singletons but if a player j ∈ N \ A has a favorite player in A, then j proves to be a
stalker of some singleton player a ∈ A.
We now show that if a NS partition exists, then partition π is NS. Each player in set
(N \ A) has his (unique) favorite player in coalition N \ A. Also, the singleton players of
A do not like any other player so would rather remain alone. ⊓⊔
For the general preferences, as long as every player likes at least one other player,
the grand coalition is NS. The problem becomes challenging if the unique favorite prop-
erty is not satisfied and there exist players which do not like any other player. Although
the case with no preference restrictions is open, it is equivalent to a restricted problem.
Theorem 6. The complexity of checking the existence of a NS partition for B-hedonic
games is equivalent to the same problem for B-hedonic games with no unacceptability.
Proof. The general problem is at least as hard as with the restriction of no unacceptabil-
ity. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the case for no unacceptability,
then the general problem can also be solved in polynomial time: change the preference
profile in the general problem so that unacceptable players are now acceptable but not
liked. Then a partition is NS in the restricted case if and only if it is NS in the general
case. ⊓⊔
Whereas NS partitions may not exist for B-hedonic games, we give a constructive
argument for the existence of IS partitions. Therefore, we add B-hedonic games to
the following list of hedonic games and preference restrictions for which IS partition
is guaranteed to exist: additively separable hedonic games with symmetric preferences
and anonymous games with single-peaked preferences [6]. This is contrast to B-hedonic
games for which even checking the existence of an IS partition is NP-complete.
Theorem 7. For B-hedonic games, an IS partition exists and it can be computed in
linear time.
Proof. If each player likes at least one other player, then the partition consisting of the
grand coalition is IS and we are done. Otherwise, we maintain a variable set of players
B which will eventually converge to a fixed set and help return an IS partition. We also
maintain a variable partition π′ = {N \ B} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ B}.
If there exists a set of players A who do not like any other player, then set the
variable set of players B to A and form the partition π′ = {N \ B} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ B}. If there
exists a player j ∈ N \ B such that j now also does not like any players in N \ B, then
set B to A ∪ { j} and update the partition π′ to {N \ B} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ B} where the updated B
is used. Since j was not liked by any player in A, he is not allowed to join any of them.
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Repeat this process until there exists no j′ ∈ N \B who likes some player in N \B. Once,
B cannot be updated anymore, we return π the final value of π′ = {N \ B} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ B}.
We now show that the returned partition π is IS. We do so by showing that none of
the players in the following sets can have a feasible IS deviation: 1. N \ B, 2. A, and 3.
B \ A.
1. Players in N \ B like at least one other player in N \ B and therefore would not
prefer to become alone. Furthermore, players in N \ B cannot join a player in B: no
singleton player in B is willing to welcome a player in N \ B.
2. Players in A ⊆ B do not like any one and prefer to stay alone.
3. Each player in x ∈ B \ A does not like any other player y ∈ B \ A who left N \ B
later than x. Therefore x will not welcome y even if y wanted to join x and form
coalition {x, y}. Therefore there is no deviation by singleton players in B \ A.
We have shown that no player in N has a feasible IS deviation. Thus π is IS. This
completes the proof. ⊓⊔
We saw in this section that B-hedonic games not only admit an IS partition but if
the ‘unique favorite property’ is satisfied, it can also be checked efficiently whether a
NS partition exists.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed hedonic coalition formation games based on the best or worst
players. In particular, we considered the existence and computation of individual-based
stability concepts in B-, W , B- and W-hedonic games. An almost complete charac-
terization of the complexity of computing stable partitions was achieved (see Table 1).
We showed that for B-hedonic games, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which
returns an IS partition. For strict preferences, it can be checked in polynomial time
whether a NS partition exists. For all other games, checking the existence of NS or IS
partitions is intractable even for many cases when preference are strict. An open prob-
lem is the complexity of checking the existence of an IS partition for W -hedonic games
when preferences are strict. It was seen that in coalition formation games based on ex-
tensions of preferences over players to preferences over sets, the following property is
a major source of intractability: presence of an unacceptable player makes the coalition
unacceptable.
Future directions of research include finding further restrictions on the preferences
so that stability is guaranteed or is computationally feasible to analyze. For example,
one can consider the case where there is a fixed ordering of the players (based on pub-
licly known trait of the players) and each player has single peaked preferences in the
ordering. Another interesting setting is when there exists a fixed global ordering of
players and each player i prefers more those players that are closer to i in the order-
ing. Furthermore one may consider scenarios with communication restrictions among
players, represented via a graph, such that only contiguous players can form a coalition.
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